If the social network structure among the voters in an election is known, how should this be taken into account by the voting rule? In this brief article, I argue, via the maximum likelihood approach to voting, that it is optimal to ignore the social network structure altogether-one person, one vote.
Introduction
The maximum likelihood framework provides a natural approach to determining an "optimal" voting rule. Under this approach, we suppose that there exists a "correct" outcome, which cannot be directly observed; however, voters' votes are noisy estimates of this correct outcome. For example, in an election between two alternatives, we may suppose that one of the alternatives is better in some objective sense, and each voter is more likely to vote for the correct (better) alternative than for the incorrect alternative. To make this concrete, suppose that there is a fixed p > 1/2 such that each voter, independently, votes for the correct alternative with probability p, and for the incorrect one with probability 1 − p.
Under such a model, it makes sense to choose the maximum likelihood estimate of the correct outcome. For example, suppose that we have a specific profile in which there are n a votes for alternative a, and n b votes for alternative b. The likelihood of this particular profile happening given that a is the correct outcome is p na (1 − p) n b , and given that b is the correct outcome it is (1−p) na p n b . If n a > n b , then the former is larger, so a is the maximum likelihood estimate; and vice versa. That is, the maximum likelihood estimate here is obtained by applying the majority rule: the alternative with more votes wins.
The study of this maximum likelihood approach to voting dates back to Condorcet [4] , who proposed a noise model that generalizes the one above to more than two alternatives. Two centuries later, Young [11, 12] showed that the maximum likelihood solution for this model coincides with the Kemeny rule [8] . A recent body of work has been devoted to the investigation of how alternative noise models lead to different rules [5, 3, 10, 2] . There is also a literature on strategic voting in such contexts-e.g., [1, 7] -but we will not consider such issues here. Another recent paper [6] explores the relationship between the maximum likelihood framework and the distance rationalizability framework, where we find the closest "consensus" election that has a clear winner, for some definition of consensus and some distance function, and choose its winner.
A common assumption in the existing work on the maximum likelihood approach is that votes are drawn independently (conditional on the correct outcome). It is easy to dispute this assumption. Voters do not make up their minds in a vacuum: they generally discuss the matter with others, and this is likely to affect their votes. Specifically, voters that talk to each other are more likely to reach the same conclusion, whether right or wrong.
This brief article considers elections in which there is some social network structure among the voters, representing which voters interact with which other voters (as well as how frequently or intensively they do so); and, moreover, this social network structure is known to the election designer. Hence, the voting rule can take the social network into account. This is not always as impractical as it may sound. For example, Facebook, Inc. decided to allow its users to vote on its future terms of use [13] . Naturally, Facebook knows the social network structure among its users very accurately. But, in order for the general idea to make sense, it is not necessary to have this level of detailed knowledge of the social network structure among the voters. For example, we may simply observe that the residents of the state of Hawaii are in some ways disconnected from the continental United States, so that there is perhaps less interaction between the two groups; and perhaps it makes sense to somehow take this into account in the design of a voting rule. Making such a statement can hardly be considered a taboo, since a voter's state of residence is already taken into account via the electoral college. In fact, one may even go so far as to wonder whether a version of the electoral college is perhaps the maximum likelihood solution for a particular probabilistic model.
So, given that we know the social network structure (or some estimate thereof), how should this affect the voting rule? We can state various suggestive intuitive arguments, such as the following.
1. Well-connected voters benefit from the insight of others so they are more likely to get the answer right. They should be weighed more heavily.
In this brief article, I will argue that all of these three suggestions are wrong-or, arguably, 1 and 2 are both correct, but cancel each other out. That is, optimal rules ignore the social network structure altogether, affirming the familiar principle of one person, one vote. The mathematical result is quite trivial once the model has been set up.
Model
In this section, I give a concrete probabilistic model that takes the social network structure into account; I will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of this model in the final section. Let v denote a vertex in the social network graph, corresponding to a voter. Let N (v) denote v's neighbors. Let V v denote voter v's vote, and V N (v) the subprofile consisting of the votes of all the neighbors of v. Let c denote the "correct" outcome. For ease of reading, the reader is encouraged to keep the simple example of an election between two alternatives in mind, so that there are two outcomes and two possible votes. However, this is not at all necessary for the main result: there can be arbitrarily many alternatives, and in fact we will not require any restriction on the outcome space, on the space of possible votes, or on the relationship between the two. For example, an outcome could consist of an individual alternative, a subset of the alternatives, or a ranking of the alternatives; and so could a vote, independently of what an outcome consists of.
For the maximum likelihood approach, we are interested in the probability of the full profile of votes, given c. I will assume that this probability can be factored as 1 It is worth noting that, in the special case where the social network graph is a clique, this assumption is not restrictive at all. I now make the following assumption which does introduce a restriction that is crucial for the result.
Assumption 1
Here, g v is intended to capture the effect that a voter is more likely to vote for the correct outcome, and h v to capture the effect that voters are likely to vote similarly to their neighbors. The key assumption is that g v does not depend on V N (v) , and h v does not depend on c. That is, the tendency to vote for the correct outcome is in a sense independent from the tendency to agree with one's neighbors.
For example, in the two-alternative case, Assumption 1 precludes models where, given that all of a vertex's neighbors vote for the correct outcome, this vertex also does so with probability 1; but given that all of the neighbors vote for the incorrect outcome, this vertex still has a positive probability of choosing the correct outcome. If this were the noise model, then if we found a vertex voting differently from all its neighbors, we should conclude that that vertex has identified the correct outcome, no matter what everyone else votes. So, in that case, the social network structure would matter.
Detailed example
For concreteness, let us consider a simple example with two vertices (voters) connected by an edge, voting over two alternatives (so a vote corresponds simply to one of the alternatives). Let −c denote the alternative other than c and let −v denote the voter other than v. For each of the two vertices v, we let g v (V v = c|c) = .7, g v (V v = −c|c) = .3, indicating that votes for the correct outcome are more likely. We also let
762, indicating that voters are more likely to agree with each other. We can now calculate that
In contrast, a model in which the two voters do not interact can be obtained by setting h = 1 everywhere; in this model, P (V v = c|c) = .7. Thus, there is some truth to the first argument in the introduction: well-connected voters benefit from the insight of others so they are more likely to get the answer right. However, it does not yet follow from this that they should be weighed more heavily, and as we will see this is in fact not the case.
Main result
We now arrive at the main result, which states that (under Assumption 1) the social network structure should not be taken into account by the voting rule.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the maximum likelihood estimate does not depend on the social network structure-more precisely, it does not depend on the functions h v (assuming they are positive everywhere). Specifically, under these conditions, the maximum likelihood estimate of the correct outcome is arg max c v g v (V v |c).
As noted before, the proof is quite trivial: Proof: By Assumption 1, we can write the likelihood as
Therefore, the maximum likelihood estimate of the correct outcome is
which does not depend on the h functions.
Because of Proposition 1, results derived in the maximum likelihood framework with the standard independence assumption still hold in our setting. For example:
Corollary 1 In a two-alternative election where Assumption 1 holds, if g v is the same for all voters v (so g v = g), and g(c|c) > g(−c|c), then the majority rule gives the maximum likelihood estimate of the correct winner.
Proof: By Proposition 1, the maximum likelihood estimate of the correct winner is arg max c v g(V v |c) (regardless of the h v functions). The remainder of the proof is as described in the introduction, letting p = g(c|c).
This also provides justification for the strong-seeming assumption of independence across voters in the maximum likelihood voting literature, showing that modeling interaction among the voters does not necessarily change the solution.
Discussion
As noted earlier, while the result in this brief article is presumably easiest to illustrate in the context of an election between two alternatives, everything in the article applies just as well to settings with more alternatives. Also, there is no requirement that votes have to take any particular form-a vote can be a ranking of the alternatives, a subset of approved alternatives, or anything else. Similarly, the correct "outcome" can be an alternative, a ranking of the alternatives, or anything else. Finally, no particular stucture on the social network graph is required for the result-for example, all voters may be directly connected to each other. The crucial assumption is Assumption 1, which separates the correct-outcome effect from the interaction effect. An argument for voting rules that take social network structure into account could be based on models that violate Assumption 1.
In this article, I have not proposed any concrete mechanism 2 by which voters influence their neighbors' opinions (for example, voters could sequentially send each other particular kinds of messages before voting); all that is needed is Assumption 1 on the distribution. On the one hand, it can be argued that it is an advantage of the model that it does not rely on such a concrete mechanism, because any analytically tractable mechanism will presumably be at best a very rough approximation of the truth. On the other hand, it still seems desirable to propose and analyze such concrete mechanisms, to see whether they violate the assumptions made here, and, if so, what their effect is on the maximum likelihood approach. In this sense, this brief article is potentially but a first step in a richer body of research.
It is instructive to compare the result in this article to a result by Nitzan and Paroush [9] . They consider a model with two alternatives where some voters are more likely to identify the correct alternative than others, and find that the optimal rule is a weighted majority rule, where more skillful voters receive a larger weight. In contrast, in the framework of this article, better-connected voters are more likely to vote correctly (as we saw in Section 3), but are not given a correspondingly larger weight (Corollary 1). There is no contradiction here: in the Nitzan-Paroush model, voters vote independently-there are no edges in the graph. Hence, more skillful voters really do contribute more valuable information, and should be weighed more heavily. In contrast, in the framework of this article, better-connected voters are not really contributing more valuable information, because some of their information is already reflected in their neighbors' votes. In fact, the Nitzan-Paroush framework can easily be accommodated in the framework of this article, by reflecting skill in the g functions. If we do so, then there are two reasons that a voter may be more likely to vote correctly than others: one is being more skillful, and the other is being better connected. By Proposition 1, the former results in a larger weight (exactly as in the result by Nitzan and Paroush), but the latter does not-a generalization of Corollary 1.
